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COSZALTER V. CITY OF SALEM:1 JUST
WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK-EXPANDING
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR THE
WHISTLEBLOWING EMPLOYEE
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2003, in Coszalter v. City of Salem,2 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]n a First Amendment
retaliation case, an adverse employment action is an act that is
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech."3 The court also held that "when
adverse employment actions are taken between three and eight
months after the plaintiffs' protected speech, a reasonable jury could
infer that retaliation is a substantial or motivating factor."4 In so
holding, the court expanded the First Amendment protections
afforded to the whistleblowing employee through a relaxation of
previous case standards in First Amendment retaliation claims.
This Comment first provides a factual background of Coszalter
and the holding of the district court. Second, it summarizes the
Ninth Circuit's decision. Third, this Comment analyzes the Ninth
Circuit's decision and acknowledges that the standard the Ninth
Circuit applied in evaluating a plaintiffs First Amendment
retaliation claim, though less stringent than previous standards, is the
proper standard. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Ninth
Circuit's decision helps to promote the current trend of growing
acceptance for the whistleblower cause.
1. 320 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 970.
4. Id.
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II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF COSZALTER V. CITY OF SALEM
A. Plaintiffs'Claim
Plaintiff Guido Coszalter is a current employee of the City of
Salem Public Works Department.5  Plaintiffs Steve Johnson and
Gary Jones are former employees of the same employer.6 The City
of Salem Public Works Department employed all three as members
of the "main line crew." 7 Around July 8, 1996, Coszalter called the
news media and reported to them a residential neighborhood's
sewage discharge problem on the surface of a city street.8  After
completing the necessary repairs on the street, defendants
9
"punitively reassigned Jones and Coszalter to new duties .... "10
After these reassignments, Johnson further complained to the State of
Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OR-OSHA)
about unsafe working conditions and violations of safety codes."
Coszalter also made complaints to the Risk Manager of the City of
Salem.12 Defendants then initiated a disciplinary investigation of
Coszalter, alleging that he was responsible for the safety violations.'
3
After the disciplinary investigation, plaintiffs reported other
safety violations. From August 1996 until around December 1997,
plaintiffs and defendants continued this cycle of reporting and
reprimanding. 14  As a result, on December 10, 1997 defendants
subjected plaintiffs Coszalter and Jones to a criminal investigation.
15
Subsequently, in March 1998, defendants reduced Coszalter's pay by
two steps after alleging he disrupted a safety training class.' 6 On
May 5, 1998, the City of Salem terminated Coszalter's employment,
5. Id.
6. Id. The facts in this case are disputed, and the following summary of
facts are according to plaintiffs' evidence. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Plaintiffs sued the City of Salem as a municipality as well as various
supervisors in their individual capacities who worked for the City of Salem at
the Public Works Department. Id.
10. Id. at 971.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 972.
JUST WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK
alleging that he had misused a cellular phone. 17 On that same day,
Johnson suffered a physical injury that prevented him from
working. 18  On May 11, 1998, Jones resigned from his
employment.
19
Although Coszalter was reinstated in June 1999-less than a
year later-the City of Salem commenced another disciplinary action
against him regarding an incident in which he was not involved.2 °
Plaintiffs thereafter sued defendants, alleging that defendants
violated their First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for
publicly disclosing the health and safety hazards.
2 1
B. Defendants 'Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon. Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The magistrate judge, relying on Nunez v. City of Los
Angeles,22 granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The
magistrate judge held that as to most of defendants' acts, "plaintiffs
had not shown the loss of a valuable benefit or privilege and
therefore had not shown an adverse employment action. ' '23  In
addition, the magistrate judge held that defendants' actions that were
"adverse" were not taken in retaliation to plaintiffs' protected
speech.24
1. The district court found that plaintiffs' speech
regarded matters of public concern
Initially the district court analyzed plaintiffs' claim against
defendants using the Supreme Court's test set forth in Board of
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 970.
22. 147 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1998).
23. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 972.
24. Id. at 973. The magistrate judge held that the reprimand against Jones,
the reduction of Coszalter's pay, and the termination of Coszalter's
employment were adverse employment actions. However, because eight
months time elapsed between plaintiffs' speech and these adverse actions, the
magistrate judge found that no direct evidence existed which showed that the
actions were taken in response to plaintiffs' protected speech. Id.
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County Commissioners v. Umbehr.25 In that case the Supreme Court
held:
[I]n order to state a claim against a government employer
for a [First Amendment violation] ... an employee must
show (1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2)
that the employer took "adverse employment action"; and
(3) that his or her speech was a "substantial or motivating
factor" for the adverse employment action. z6
As a threshold matter, the district court determined that
plaintiffs' speech was protected under the First Amendment. In
Pickering v. Board of Education,27 the Supreme Court held that an
employee's speech is protected under the First Amendment if it
addresses "a matter of legitimate public concern." 28 In Allen v.
Scribner,29 the Ninth Circuit held that "the determination of whether
an employee's speech deals with such an issue of public concern is to
be made with reference to 'the content, form, and context' of the
speech. 30  Thus, "[s]peech that deals with 'individual personnel
disputes and grievances' and that would be of 'no relevance to the
public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies' is
generally not of 'public concern."
31
Based on the Allen standard, the magistrate judge concluded that
all but one of plaintiffs' assertions of protected speech regarded
matters of public concern.32 Thus, the magistrate judge found
plaintiffs' protected speech included Coszalter's contacting the news
media to disclose the existence of an ongoing sewage discharge and
Johnson's complaints of unsafe working conditions to the OR-
OSHA.33 The magistrate judge did not find Jones's reporting to
management that his backhoe had been vandalized to be a matter of
25. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
26. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973 (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996)).
27. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. Id. at 571.
29. 812 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1987).
30. Id. at 430 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
31. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973 (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d
1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)).
32. Id. at 974.
33. For a complete list of plaintiffs' protected speech, see id.
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public concern, "reasoning that this disclosure was of no relevance to
the public's evaluation of the performance of the government.
3 4
2. The district court concluded that most of defendants' actions
were not adverse employment actions
Analyzing the second element of plaintiffs' First Amendment
retaliation claim, the magistrate judge concluded that most of
defendants' actions did not constitute adverse employment actions.
35
The magistrate judge based this decision on the court's previous
opinion in Nunez v. City of Los Angeles.36 In Nunez, the court stated,
"Although 'the type of sanction.., need not be particularly great in
order to find that rights have been violated,' the plaintiff must
nonetheless demonstrate the loss of 'a valuable governmental benefit
or privilege."' 37 Consequently, the magistrate judge concluded that
"if an alleged retaliatory act [could] not be characterized as the loss
of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege, it [could] never
constitute an adverse employment action in a First Amendment
retaliation case."
38
In the instant case, the district court concluded that most of
defendants' acts, including threats of disciplinary action,
unwarranted disciplinary investigations, and unpleasant work
assignments did not constitute adverse employment actions because
plaintiffs did not demonstrate any loss of a valuable governmental
benefit or privilege.
39
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 147 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1998).
37. Id. at 875 (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
38. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 974.
39. Id. at 972-73. For a complete list of all the incidents that the district
court concluded were not adverse employment actions, see id. The magistrate
judge concluded that three of defendants' acts were adverse employment
actions, but nevertheless granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed
to satisfy the third element in their First Amendment retaliation claim. See
infra Part II.B.3.
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3. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' protected speech
did not substantially motivate defendants' adverse
employment actions
To successfully plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, the
final element that a plaintiff must show is that the plaintiffs
protected speech was a "substantial or motivating factor" for the
adverse employment actions.40 In Coszalter, the magistrate judge
found that three of defendants' employment acts were adverse: the
reprimand of Jones, the reduction of Coszalter's pay, and the
termination of Coszalter's employment.4' However, the judge
granted summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' speech was
not a "substantial or motivating factor for these acts. 42 Because the
magistrate judge granted summary judgment based on these three
adverse employment actions, the judge did not consider whether the
other alleged retaliatory acts were a result of plaintiffs' protected
speech.43
In addition to holding that plaintiffs' protected speech was not a
substantial or motivating factor for defendants' adverse employment
acts, the magistrate judge considered the elapsed time between
plaintiffs' speech and defendants' actions. 44 In this case, "[t]he
elapsed times between the protected speech and the adverse actions
were eight months, three months, and five months, respectively.
'" 45
The magistrate judge concluded that no relation existed between
defendants' actions and plaintiffs' protected speech because these
elapsed time periods "were too long, without regard to other
circumstances, to support an inference of retaliation.
4 6
III. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS AND DECISION
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
47
While agreeing with the district court's analysis of the first element
40. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 977.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 973.
JUST WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK
in the three-part test for a First Amendment retaliation claim, the
court disagreed with the district court's analysis of the final two
elements.4F Thus, as to the first element, which considers whether
plaintiffs engaged in protected speech, the court agreed with all of
the district court's findings with respect to the classification of
plaintiffs' speech as indeed protected.49
Next, the court analyzed whether defendants took adverse
employment actions against plaintiffs. Whereas the district court
analyzed this element based on whether plaintiffs suffered the "loss
of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege," 50 the court used the
standard set forth in Ray v. Henderson.51 The court first explained
the government employer's nature and noted that a government
employer "'cannot condition public employment on a basis that
infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of expression."' 52  Moreover, "[w]hen a government
employee exercises his protected right of free expression, the
government cannot use the employment relationship as a means to
retaliate for that expression." 53 Finally, the court emphasized the
irrelevancy of the district court's requirement of a "loss of a valuable
governmental benefit or privilege" in determining whether an
employment action was adverse.
54
In analyzing this second element, the court also clarified the
district court's usage of the "loss of valuable benefit or privilege"
test set forth in Nunez. 55 Acknowledging that Nunez suggested that a
plaintiff "must ... demonstrate the loss 'of a valuable governmental
48. See id. at 974.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 972.
51. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
52. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 974 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
142 (1983)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 975. The court cited Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 428
(9th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1989);
Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2002);
and Anderson v. Cent. Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1984) as
examples of where the court found the question of whether an act of retaliation
was in the form of the removal of a benefit or the imposition of a burden to be
irrelevant. Id.
55. Seeid.
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benefit or privilege,"' 56 the court explained that in light of its other
cases, it could not "read this language as establishing an exclusive,
category-based limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that is
actionable under the First Amendment." 57 Thus, the court concluded
that the "essential holding of Nunez is simply that when an
employer's response includes only minor acts, such as 'bad-
mouthing,' that cannot reasonably be expected to deter protected
speech, such acts do not violate an employee's First Amendment
rights. 58
Based on its reading of Nunez, the court concluded that the
proper standard for this second element was the "reasonably likely to
deter" standard. The court cited two recent cases as instructive on
the matter: Ray v. Henderson59 and Moore v. California Institute of
Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory.60 In those cases, Title VII
and the False Claims and Major Fraud Acts protected each
employee's speech, respectively. 61 Although Coszalter encompassed
protected speech under the First Amendment, the court stated that the
"reasonably likely to deter" standard as set forth in Ray and Moore
was indeed applicable to this case.62  Clarifying that it was not
adopting a new standard, the court specified that its "reasonably
likely to deter" standard was "a more specific articulation of the
standard set forth in previous First Amendment retaliation cases."
63
Therefore, the court held that the magistrate judge erred when he
found that defendants' acts, including transferring plaintiffs to new
job duties, performing unwarranted disciplinary investigations, and
56. Id. (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992)).
57. Id. The court further explained that if this were not the case, the
government would be allowed to take sever6 retaliatory action, such as
instigating unwarranted criminal investigations or disciplinary actions, as long
as those actions did not result in the loss of a valuable governmental benefit or
privilege. See id. at 975-76.
58. Id. at 976.
59. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
60. 275 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244-46; Moore, 275 F.3d at 848.
62. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 976.
63. Id. In other words, the "reasonably likely to deter" test is comparable to
the standard from previous First Amendment cases where the Court's goal was
to prevent, or redress, actions by the government employer that chilled the
exercise of protected First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990).
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reprimanding based on false accusations, were not adverse
employment actions. 64 The court held that defendants' actions were
adverse employment actions because all of defendants' acts, when
taken together, "amounted to a severe and sustained campaign of
employer retaliation that was 'reasonably likely to deter' plaintiffs
from engaging in speech protected under the First Amendment.,
65
Finally, the court analyzed the last element in plaintiffs' First
Amendment retaliation claim, specifically addressing whether
plaintiffs' speech was a "substantial or motivating factor" for
defendants' adverse employment actions.66 The district court found,
and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that three of defendants' acts-
including the reprimand against Jones, the reduction of Coszalter's
pay, and the termination of Coszalter's employment were adverse
employment actions. 6 7  However, unlike the district court's
conclusion that the elapsed time between the protected speech and
the adverse employment actions was too long to support an inference
of retaliation, the court concluded that enough evidence existed to
support an inference of retaliation.6 8
In Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified School District,69 the court
listed three ways in which a plaintiff could show that retaliation was
a substantial or motivating factor behind a defendant's adverse
employment action:
First, a plaintiff can introduce evidence regarding the
"proximity in time between the protected action and the
allegedly retaliatory employment decision," from which a
"jury logically could infer [that the plaintiff] was terminated
in retaliation for his speech." Second, a plaintiff can
introduce evidence that "his employer expressed opposition
to his speech, either to him or to others." Third, the
plaintiff can introduce evidence that "his employer's
64. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 976 (listing all the employment actions the court
believed could have been adverse under the "reasonably likely to deter" test).
65. Id. at 977.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 973.
68. Id.
69. 265 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2001).
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proffered explanations for the adverse employment action
were false and pretextual. 7 °
In this case, the elapsed time periods between the protected
speech and the three adverse employment actions were eight months,
three months, and five months, respectively. 71 Although in Allen v.
Iranon72 the court held that "an eleven-month gap in time is within
the range that has been found to support an inference that an
employment decision was retaliatory,, 73 here the court cautioned that
such "a sPecified time period cannot be a mechanically applied
criterion." Moreover, the court noted that a "rule that any period
over a certain time is per se too long (or, conversely, a rule that any
period under a certain time is per se short enough) would be
unrealistically simplistic.
7 5
The district court stopped short of completely addressing this
third element because it determined that the elapsed time period was
too long to raise an inference of retaliation.76 However, because the
Ninth Circuit did not limit itself to a rigid time period as the district
court did, it held that the issue of whether plaintiffs' protected speech
was a "substantial or motivating factor" behind defendants' adverse
actions would have to be remanded back to the lower courts.
7 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit's decision was a major victory for employees
who were unable to report their employer's improper activities for
fear of retaliation.78 Because society values the whistleblowers' role
70. Id. at 751-52 (quoting Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d 1209,
1212 (9th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original)).
71. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977.
72. 283 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).
73. Id. at 1078.
74. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977.
75. Id. at 977-78.
76. Id. at 978.
77. See id. at 978-79. The court also discussed how plaintiffs provided
additional evidence to show that defendants' employment actions were
pretextual, and that retaliation was indeed a motivation behind defendants'
actions. See id. at 978. Finally, the court rejected defendants' qualified
immunity claim, pending the outcome of the issues remanded to the lower
court. See id. at 979.
78. The remainder of the article will refer to those employees who do speak
out against their employer as "whistleblowers."
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in revealing their employer's improper activities, the court correctly
held that in a First Amendment retaliation case, an "adverse
employment action" is an act that is reasonably likely to deter
employees from engaging in constitutionally protected speech.79
The concept of a whistleblowing employee is neither a new idea
nor an anomaly of the courts and society. For example, Time
magazine recently named as "Persons of the Year for 2002" three
whistleblowers: Cynthia Cooper of Worldcom, Coleen Rowley of
the FBI, and Sherron Watkins of Enron.8 0 Moreover, courts have
noted that "[d]issenters and whistleblowers rarely win popularity
contests or Dale Carnegie awards. They are frequently irritating and
unsettling. These qualities, however, do not necessarily make their
views wrong or unhelpful ... ,,81
Society has grown increasingly more receptive to the
whistleblower's cause not only because of the whistleblower's
connection to society's values but also because of the important
issues whistleblowers address. For example, although agencies both
stress that "[1]oyalty to team and group has always been valued in the
American culture," 82 and claim that whistleblowers are disloyal to
the agency, media coverage and congressional attention more often
"present the same whistleblowers as heroes. 83  Furthermore,
whistleblowers typically reveal health and safety issues that are
important to people. Whistleblowing is "'more likely to occur when
there is increasing public concern for environmental, health, and
safety problems' and when there is concern for the government's
effectiveness in monitoring hazards and maintaining safety
hazards." 84 Thus, because society values whistleblowers' roles in
keeping their respective employers in check, whistleblowers should
have their speech protected to the fullest extent under the First
Amendment's wings.
79. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 970.
80. Monique C. Lillard, Exploring Paths to Recovery for OSHA
Whistleblowers: Section 11(C) of the OSHAct and the Public Policy Tort, 6
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 329, 333 n.14 (2002).
81. Id. at 330 (quoting Greenberg v. Kmetko, 840 F.2d 467, 477 (7th Cir.
1988) (Cudahy, J., dissenting)).
82. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKs-AND
WHY 14 (2003).
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
Fall 2003]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:169
A. The Court Correctly Held Plaintiffs' Speech was a
Matter of Public Concern
In recognizing the plaintiffs' speech as a matter of public
concern, and thus as protected speech, the court correctly interpreted
what speech should be protected under the First Amendment. It is
important to note that the Supreme Court has already recognized the
value of speech that criticizes officials' wrongdoings. Thus, in New
York Times v. Sullivan,s5 the Court's decision focused on the premise
of a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." 86 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit has held that speech should only be "characterized as
not [a matter] of 'public concern' when it is clear . . . that the
information would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of
the performance of governmental agencies."
8 7
Here, even if plaintiffs' reports to the news media about OSHA
safety violations or sewage discharges near schoolyards appeared
unpleasant, the Ninth Circuit, in agreeing with the district court,
properly reasoned that these disclosures were indeed relevant to the
public's evaluation of the government's performance and actions.
88
B. The Court Correctly Held Defendants 'Actions were Adverse
Employment Actions
The court correctly held that defendants' actions were adverse
employment actions. In making its determination, the court correctly
emphasized the fact that a government employer cannot abuse its
position and interfere with the constitutional right to exercise
freedom of expression guaranteed to employees under the First
Amendment. 89 Moreover, without rejecting the holding in Nunez,
the court properly limited Nunez's holding by requiring an employee
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. Id. at 270; see also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government
Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of "Efficiency", 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
17, 63 (1996) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
87. Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting McKinley
v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)).
88. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 974.
89. See id.
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to show the "loss of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege" in
order to show an adverse employment action. 90 Rather, the court
held that it would not interpret Nunez as "establishing an exclusive,
category-based limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that is
actionable under the First Amendment." 91 To expand its protection
of employees, the court chose to adopt a more relaxed standard
favoring employees' attempts to show adverse employment actions.
Specifically, in adopting the "reasonably likely to deter" standard set
forth in two recent cases, the court allowed employees greater ease
and flexibility in proving their cases.
92
The court correctly determined that its holdings in Ray v.
Henderson93 and Moore v. California Institute of Technology Jet
Propulsion Laboratory controlled. In Ray, the main issue was
whether plaintiff's employer's actions constituted an adverse
employment action against plaintiffs complaints of perceived
unfairness towards women employees at the United States Postal
Service.95  The Ray court adopted the language of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines and held that the
"reasonably likely to deter" standard was the applicable standard to
determine whether an adverse employment action existed.96
Similarly, the Moore court adopted that same standard in a case
involving retaliation claims against an employee who spoke out
about fraud at the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion
Lab.97 Although Moore involved retaliation claims brought under
the federal False Claims Act and the Major Fraud Act, the court
adopted the standard set forth in Ray, a Title VII retaliation claim.
98
In the instant case, the court consistently adopted the standard
applied in Ray and Moore. Just as those two decisions involved
speech deserving of heightened protection, the speech here-
categorically protected under the First Amendment-rightfully
deserves as much protection as possible.
90. See id. at 975-76.
91. Id. at 975.
92. See id at 976.
93. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. 275 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 976.
96. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242-43.
97. See Moore, 275 F.3d at 841, 847-48.
98. See id.
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The "reasonably likely to deter" standard achieves this goal and
gives employees needed protection when speaking out against their
employers. Without such leeway or increased protection of their
speech, whistleblowers will once again crawl back into hiding,
deterred from speaking out against their employers. By allowing
courts to determine that an employer's action is adverse simply if
that action is "reasonably likely to deter" an employee from engaging
in protected activity, the court demonstrated its commitment to
ensuring protection for employee whistleblowers.
C. The Court Correctly Held that Plaintiffs 'Protected Speech was a
Substantial or Motivating Factor for Defendants'Adverse
Employment Actions
The court correctly determined that it could infer retaliation
despite the elapsed time periods between plaintiffs' speech and
defendants' adverse employment actions. This was unlike the
district court's determination that retaliation played no factor in
defendants' actions. The court properly rejected any per se rule that
a certain period of elapsed time between a plaintiffs protected
speech and the adverse employment action would automatically
invalidate a plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim.
99
Specifically, the court's proffered reason for rejecting any per se
rule articulated precisely the rationale of its decision. The court
stated that "[r]etaliation often follows quickly upon the act that
offended the retaliator, but this is not always so."' 00  Because
whistleblowers are indeed placed in a precarious position with their
decision to speak out against their employer, an employer may "wait
until the victim is especially vulnerable or until an especially hurtful
action becomes possible."'' Most importantly, the court stressed
that, a per se rule specifying a time period as too long to support an
inference of retaliation would enable the employer to "wait until they
[thought] the lapse of time [would disguise] their true motivation.
'' 02
For example, an employer could simply not reveal his intentions and
99. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
100. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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also not provide demonstrably false or pretextual reasons for his acts,
and thus escape freely from any allegations of retaliation.
10 3
The court solidified its protections afforded to whistleblowers in
rejecting any per se rule. This rejection enables a court to consider
an act as retaliatory in light of the totality of the circumstances, even
in a case such as Coszalter, where the alleged retaliatory act took
place eight months after a plaintiffs protected speech occurred.
10 4
Providing no set time period beyond which employer's acts cannot
support an inference of retaliation and forcing future courts to
consider the factual setting and totality of the circumstances means
that employers can no longer hide their adverse acts behind any
protective time wall. Following the tone set throughout the rest of its
decision, the court gives the employee the benefit of the doubt and
warns the employer to watch out and understand that its actions will
not be tolerated, especially if found retaliatory.
10 5
V. IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Coszalter properly solidified the
court's commitment to protecting First Amendment expression. In
his concurrence to the decision, Judge Ferguson aptly described the
main outcome of Coszalter-that of protecting the state employee
from acts of retaliation. 10 6  Specifically, Judge Ferguson quoted
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois10 7 where the U.S. Supreme
Court stated, "[T]he First Amendment... protects state employees
not only from patronage dismissals but also from 'even an act of
retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public
employee ...when intended to punish her for exercising her free
speech rights."' 0 8  Coszalter provides reassurances to
whistleblowers that their speech is not trivial and is strongly
protected under the First Amendment from retaliation.
Whistleblowers will always face two differing motivations in
deciding whether or not to report their employer's violation. On the
103. See id.
104. Id. at 978.
105. See id. at 978-79.
106. Id. at 979.
107. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
108. Id. at 76-77 n.8 (1990) (quoting the lower court opinion at 868 F.2d
943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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one hand, "[p]opular culture often adulates the whistleblower."'
10 9
On the other hand, "[m]any employees are afraid of reprisal for
whistleblowing, and their fears lead to silence. ' 1° Nevertheless, the
public appears to be forming a more positive view towards
whistleblowers because of the increase in and positive spin of media
coverage; newspapers and magazines often feature whistleblowers as
public interest heroes.' Such media coverage, combined with the
court's holding providing for greater protection for the
whistleblower's First Amendment speech, may make even the most
wary of whistleblowers feel more inclined to report their employer's
improper activities.
The Ninth Circuit's decision will surely face its critics. Even
before Coszalter, critics voiced their opinions against laws that
expanded the support of whistleblowers. For example, some critics
suggested that whistleblowers' "motives range from putrid to pure.
While some are impelled by an acute sense of justice or public
concern, others are like ants longing to be grasshoppers."' 1 Despite
these critics who are against the trend towards greater whistleblower
protection, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless provides the necessary
balance between what is and is not to be considered an employer's
First Amendment violation. Though not attempting to scare
employers from denying allegations of workplace violations, the
Ninth Circuit does provide gentle guidance and warning that it will
not tolerate employers who improperly prevent their employees from
rightfully speaking out.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Often the very act of whistleblowing indicates that
governmental regulation has been inadequate to protect the public; it
represents a breakdown of systems whose very goal is to make sure
that misconduct does not occur in the first place."
113
109. Lillard, supra note 80, at 333.
110. Id. at331-32.
111. See JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 21.
112. Id. at 94 (quoting DAVID W. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE
ORGANIZATION 88 (1977)).
113. Lillard, supra note 80, at 333 (quoting Winters v. Houston Chronicle
Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. 1990)).
JUST WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK
In a dynamic society where breakdowns of systems are
inevitable, the whistleblowing employee provides the public some
assurance that the government is functioning properly, especially in
the areas of safety and health. In this case, plaintiffs Coszalter,
Jones, and Johnson were punished for speaking out against their
employers regarding safety and health violations. However, the
Ninth Circuit protected these plaintiffs from their employer's adverse
employment actions. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit has provided the
necessary protections to future employees who are faced with similar
circumstances as the plaintiffs faced in this case.
This decision solidifies the concept that when an employer
attempts to retaliate against a whistleblowing employee for speaking
up about workplace violations, the First Amendment will rightfully
protect the outspoken employee. By adopting a set of standards that
allow whistleblowers more leeway in proving their First Amendment
cases against their employers, the court provides needed protection to
employees who fear retaliation from employers who decide to violate
workplace rules.
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